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"Mr. President, I would not rule out the opportunity to preserve a nucleus of human specimens. It 
would be quite easy, at the bottom of some of our deeper mineshqfts...nuclear reactors could 
provide power almost indefinitely, greenhouses could provide plant life, animals could be bred 
and slaughtered! Of course it would be vital that our top political and military men be included to 
foster and impart the required principles of leadership and tradition...They would breed quite 
prodigiously, eh? There would be much time and little to do. With the proper breeding techniques 
and a ratio of say ten females to each male, I would guess they would work their way back to the 
present gross national product in twenty years. " 
Dr. Strangelove 
42 © Canadian Military History, Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 1997, pp.42-56. 
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D ur ing the Cold War, many NATO governments developed highly secret 
contingency plans to maintain the continuity of 
government (COG) during and after nuclear 
attack. Canada was no exception. COG planning 
generally consisted of several elements including 
legal mechanisms and constitutional matters; 
document duplication and storage; skeleton 
bureaucracies; dispersion; transportation; and 
shelter. All were necessary to keep Canada 
functioning as a nation in the face of an attack 
by Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs. The most 
misunderstood element of COG planning has 
been the shelter component. Critics of civil 
defence programmes argued that protecting 
government leaders in shelters and not providing 
similar facilities to the population as a whole 
was "undemocratic," designed to maintain the 
"power elite."1 The reality of Canada's COG 
programme was quite different from this 
propaganda line and its ability to protect the 
country's leaders in underground facilities was 
much more limited than alleged. This study will 
concentrate on the strategic context, physical 
a r rangements and concepts of operation 
developed to maintain the continuity of Canadian 
government in the era of the greatest danger 
during the Cold War, 1958 to 1963. 
Dr. Strangelove notwithstanding, Canada's 
initial COG planning did in fact focus on using 
mineshafts as interim underground COG sites. 
In July 1947, the armed force's Joint Planning 
Committee asked the Department of Mines and 
Resources to survey and report on the number, 
size, depth and access to transportation nodes 
of major mines in Canada. Little was done 
beyond this until the Soviets conducted their first 
successful thermonuclear test. Up to this point, 
thinking was geared towards dispersing industry 
and government, possibly providing above 
ground concrete shelters to house both.2 The 
owners of the Silica Sand Workings at Bell's 
Corners (on the outskirts of Ottawa near Kanata) 
offered the use of their mine to the Government. 
Analysts concluded that the mine was capable 
of supporting a small command centre, with 
limited storage space. The mine was essentially 
a descending 14' by 14' tunnel going from the 
surface to a depth of 120 feet. This project was, 
as one document cryptically notes, "superseded 
by events," probably information that the Soviet 
Union had exploded a hydrogen bomb in the 
megaton yield.3 
The introduction of Soviet megaton-yield 
nuclear weapons and their a t tachment to 
intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles 
drastically altered NATO conceptions on how a 
war would be fought. This, in turn, radically 
affected Canadian defence planning and seriously 
stimulated the Diefenbaker government's COG 
policy. In basic terms, Canadian COG policy was 
structured to operate within the context of 
NATO's strategic concept MC 14/2. This strategic 
concept, arrived at by consensus within NATO, 
was based on a two-phase pattern of war: 
Phase I: A period of violent large scale organized 
fighting of a comparatively short duration, not 
likely to exceed thirty days, the first few days 
which would be characterized by the greater 
intensity of nuclear exchange. 
Phase II: A longer period of indeterminate 
duration for reorganization, resupply, and the 
accomplishment of necessary military tasks 
leading to a conclusion of the war.4 
Phase II could last months or years. 
The role of North America in MC 14/2 was 
twofold. Canadian and American air and naval 
defence forces had to protect the United States 
Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases 
so that Phase I could end as quickly as possible 
in NATO's favour, and they had to protect or at 
least limit damage to the population and 
mobil izat ion base in North America. 
Conventional and reinforcement forces to defend 
and/or re-take Europe had to be mobilized from 
this base in Phase II, since practically all of these 
forces would come from Canada and the United 
States. Continuity of Government was thus vital 
so that defence forces could be commanded as 
effectively as possible in Phase I, and so 
Canadian and European society would continue 
to exist during and after Phase II.5 
Canada's government, then, had to survive 
for up to 30 days against a sustained nuclear 
attack in the first few days and sporadic nuclear 
attack for three more weeks, command defence 
forces during the first 30 days of a nuclear war, 
and then rebuild and recover those portions of 
the country suffering from direct nuclear attack 
and fallout afterwards. This seems incredible, 
given the commonly-perceived gargantuan size 
of the superpower's strategic nuclear armouries. 
Readers should remember, however, that NATO 
possessed overwhelming strategic nuclear 
43 
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superiority in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet 
Union could not destroy the world 15 times over 
yet (as it could in the 1970s when it achieved 
strategic parity with the United States) and their 
200 or so long-range strategic bombers and 14 
missile-launching submarines6 had, in the 1959-
1961 period, to contend with significant air and 
naval defences protecting North America. Even 
by 1963 the Soviets possessed only about 100 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), none 
of which were very accurate. 
After a nuclear attack, Canada's leadership 
would have to piece together a shattered country 
in addition to carrying on a war. One estimate of 
resources in Canada two days after a nuclear 
attack concluded that, "out of a pre-attack 
populat ion of 18,238,000, approximately 
1,105,000 are estimated to have been killed and 
803,000 injured by direct effects of the attack."7 
As well, 710,000 people were estimated to be 
trapped but relatively uninjured in some areas, 
requiring rescue. A further 2,773,000 people 
were estimated to be in heavy to medium fallout-
contaminated areas, of which about 50 per cent 
would die in the long term and the rest subject 
to lengthy hospitalization. 
Unfortunately one-fifth of the hospital 
facilities in Canada were assumed to be 
destroyed. The road network survived but the 
rail network was severely damaged since it had 
nodes in most major cities. Long distance 
telephone service between eastern and western 
Canada was down at Winnipeg, though broadcast 
communications survived, as did 75 per cent of 
the petroleum refineries, and 80 per cent of the 
electric generating capability. (Planners did not 
yet understand the effects of electromagnetic 
pulse). On the plus side, "94% of fisherman and 
their boats and gear have survived the attack 
unscathed."8 A lot of Canadians would be relying 
on fish as a staple food in a post-at tack 
environment. 
The St. Laurent government recognized the 
need to plan for COG but was voted out of office 
before any serious work could be undertaken. 
This early planning revolved around the mass 
evacuation of major cities but it was never 
implemented.9 It was up to R.B. Bryce, the 
Secretary of the Cabinet, to remind the 
Diefenbaker government in 1957 that there could 
be dire consequences if COG were neglected: 
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The nature of the threat to Canada Is now such, 
as you are well aware, that unless active civilian 
preparations are undertaken there is a very real 
danger that under attack the country would not 
hold together as an economic and political entity. 
This in tu rn would prevent the conduct of 
effective military operations.10 
The original Cabinet working group established 
under St. Laurent was refurbished and served 
as the mechanism to coordinate COG, national 
survival, and civil defence measures. Eventually 
the Emergency Measures Organization (EMO) 
was established in June 1957 to coordinate COG 
planning alongside the Department of National 
Defence. EMO also represented Canada on the 
NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee, a 
body which exchanged information between 
NATO countries on such matters.11 
By mid-1958 some semblance of a COG 
policy was "in-being."12 Diefenbaker's staff had 
developed minimal COG requirements which 
served as the basis for an implementation 
programme. These included requirements for 
decentralized, secure, alternate ^ headquarters 
outside of Ottawa and the provincial capitals; 
communications to link them; and an emergency 
national broadcast capability. Thought was given 
to making use of existing above-ground 
buildings, but the planners concluded that "(a) 
few will probably have to be built to be able to 
operate notwithstanding heavy radioactive fallout 
in the area and possible nuclear explosions near 
by, taking into account the special danger we 
face in Canada from bombs exploding as a result 
of the main air battle over our heads."13 An 
"Emergency Communications Centre" was 
envisioned and the planners noted that "the 
existence of [the] various sites is bound to 
become known but we wish to keep the real 
nature and importance of them as secret as 
possible."14 The broad outlines of the COG 
programme were announced by the Prime 
Minister in August 1958.15 
Incredible though it seems, the minimal COG 
requi rements (and their implementat ion 
sequences) were developed without the creation 
of a formal threat estimate by the COG planners. 
Threat estimates did exist, as the Diefenbaker 
government was immersed in overhauling 
Canada's air defence system, but there is no 
indication that COG planners in 1958 or 1959 
had direct access to them. They probably relied 
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More detailed and formal planning was 
conducted in earnest with the initiation of the 
rather dangerous Berlin Crisis in 1958. EMO 
proposed a four-part COG programme: 1 ) create 
an interim DND and Government emergency 
headquarters outside of Ottawa; 2) remove from 
Ottawa and decentralize as much of the federal 
government as possible without loss of efficiency 
in peacetime; 3) construct a permanent 250-man 
underground building to replace the interim 
emergency HQ; and 4) develop back -up 
headquarters at dispersed locations.19 
The location of the interim government 
headquarters was code-named RUSTIC. In 
general t e rms the RUSTIC site was to 
accommodate 250 people and had to be able to 
operate on a few hours notice. There were two 
competitors for the RUSTIC site: the RCAF base 
at Trenton, and Camp Petawawa. Some thought 
was given to using Kingston, but there were too 
many other impor t an t command and 
communications facilities already located there. 
Petawawa won out. It was in a less sparsely 
populated area and Trenton could receive doses 
of fallout from targets hit in the United States.20 
Camp Petawawa was a standard Army base 
consisting of permanent and semi-permanent 
buildings dispersed over a wide area. RUSTIC 
occupied the old training and administration 
building and four other smaller buildings. Its 
45 
on informal information provided by DND and 
the RCAF, or through NATO channels. Warning 
time, based on the DEW and Mid-Canada radar 
lines, was assumed to be three to four hours. 
For some reason planners used a hypothetical 5 
megaton Soviet weapon ground burst as the 
nominal threat posed to Canadian targets, and 
this affected the specifications for the permanent 
COG facilities. Ground b u r s t s produced 
exponentially more fallout over a wider area.16 
Concur r en t with the Diefenbaker 
government's interest in COG and in response 
to the adoption of MC 14/2 as the overall strategic 
concept, DND and the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
explored methods aimed at improving the 
survivability of the various military headquarters 
which were, at that time, located in temporary 
wartime buildings in Ottawa.17 Between 1958 
and 1960 both parties developed three primary 
COG projects: RUSTIC, EASE, and BRIDGE. 
Prior to 1958, the Army had an interim plan 
to use the Civil Defence College at Arnprior, 
Ontario as an emergency DND headquarters if 
Ottawa were attacked. Arnprior was a former 
RCAF station and possessed an airfield, but had 
no fallout protection or underground buildings. 
It was upwind of any nuclear attack on Ottawa 
and was near a mid-sized town which had 
adequate utili t ies to suppor t an interim 
headqua r t e r s . These a r rangements were 
informal and not cleared with the College.18 
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communications were spread out all over the 
camp. All five basements were modified to 
include air filters and sealant to protect them 
from radioactive fallout. RUSTIC was, therefore, 
quite crowded. Camp Petawawa functioned as 
both the emergency DND headquarters in 
addition to the interim civilian government 
headquarters. Additionally, its communications 
were less than adequate to handle command and 
control for all three services (which used three 
different communications systems), the RCMP 
communica t ions sys tem, the Canad ian 
Broadcasting Corporation, External Affair's 
diplomatic system, and intelligence links.21 
Despite its rudimentary appearance and its 
ad hoc nature, RUSTIC was in all respects a 
highly classified facility: 
...the existence of this site, Its location, and the 
Intention to transfer the central operations of 
government to it In an emergency were classified 
as TOP SECRET [and] t h a t Informat ion 
concerning these matters, or about RUSTIC 
generally, should be given to other governmental 
officers on a strictly need to know basis....22 
A cover story was prepared to preserve RUSTIC'S 
real purpose. In case anybody asked, the 
buildings were trial facilities set up temporarily 
as an Army command post for an exercise.23 
RUSTIC had to soldier on until the permanent 
underground facilities were built. 
There was some discussion regarding 
dependents. Should the wives and families be 
told? Justice Minister Davie Fulton thought that 
families should be advised that, in an emergency, 
RUSTIC personnel had duties outside Ottawa 
and that they "would get in touch with them as 
soon as possible afterwards. This would enable 
families to make appropriate preparations ahead 
of time."24 These details were left ambiguous by 
the emergency planning committee and no 
agreement was reached. 
The first serious COG deployment exercise, 
Exercise ARCADIA, was conducted in December 
1959 while the Berlin Crisis was gathering 
steam. ARCADIA'S aim was to "familiarize 
departmental officials with the RUSTIC facilities 
and the procedures for manning them"25 by 
walking through the entire alert, transportation, 
and manning process. The principles were given 
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limited warning in that they were told that an 
exercise would happen within a three-day span 
and that they would not be gone from Ottawa 
for more than 12 hours. Movement to RUSTIC 
was by Army bus, though the RCAF did practice 
an air movement concurrently with the ground 
move. A total of 135 civil servants were picked 
up over a three-day period at the main entrance 
to the Centre Block of the Parliament Buildings 
and at the S impsons-Sears store at the 
Carlingwood Shopping Centre. Upon conveyance 
to RUSTIC, they were subjected to lectures like 
"The Effects of Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons" and 
other scary topics relating to projected post-
attack conditions in Canada. These people were 
the skele ton cells for each Government 
department who would deploy to RUSTIC in the 
event of an attack and the movement was phased 
over three days for administrative reasons. 
One important aspect about ARCADIA was 
the lack of a realistic warning and reaction 
period, that is, there was no scenario. Later 
exercises would, however, incorporate more 
detailed "nuclear attack" scenarios. 
While the bureaucra t s were shut t l ing 
between Ottawa and Petawawa in olive drab 
buses , the RCAF tested its air movement 
planning. There were three levels of alert for the 
air movement units, indicated by the code words 
"CRASH ACTION," "READINESS" and 
"EMERGENCY." Each code word would be 
preceded by either "RUSTIC" if it were a real 
attack situation, or "ARCADIA" for exercise 
purposes. CRASH ACTION ordered one North 
Star four-engined transport aircraft from 412(T) 
Squadron at Uplands and one Vertol 107 
Labrador helicopter from 4(T) Operational 
Training Unit in Trenton to move to RCAF station 
Rockliffe in Ottawa. READINESS held the aircraft 
at Rockliffe on 30-minute standby. EMERGENCY 
ordered the helicopter to the east side of the grass 
area near the Peace Tower at Parliament Hill and 
other locations in Ottawa to pick up officials and 
shuttle them to Rockliffe. The North Star would 
then depart Rockliffe for an airfield at Bonnchere, 
south west of Petawawa.26 
The December 1959 exercise included the 
first two steps and omitted EMERGENCY. If 
CRASH ACTION were given at 0817 hours, the 
North Star would be at Rockliffe by 0830, the 
helicopter would arrive at 0913 hours. Once 
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Armageddon taxis: In the event of 
nuclear war, a Labrador helicopter 
(Top) would be despatched to 
Parliament Hill to pick up the nation's 
leaders. It would then go to CFB 
Uplands where the passengers would 
be transferred to a North Star 4-
engined transport (Bottom) Jor a 35-
minute flight to the RUSTIC facUity at 
Petawawa. 
(CFPU PL 143744 & 107623) 
EMERGENCY was ordered, it would 
take t he he l icopter one h o u r to 
s h u t t l e t h e p r i n c i p l e s f rom 
Parliament Hill to Rockliffe and a 35-
m i n u t e flight from Rockliffe to 
B o n n c h e r e . I f p a s s e n g e r s were 
already at Rockliffe, this would cut 
down the time to ten minu tes for 
loading and a 35-minute flight.27 
As noted earlier, RUSTIC was an 
in te r im facility, a t l eas t for t he 
civilian government. RUSTIC would 
continue to serve as one possible 
emergency locat ion for the DND 
leadership, later u n d e r the code-
n a m e TRIDENT. Long t e r m civil 
gove rnmen t COG facilities were 
su rveyed in 1 9 5 9 . The g e n e r a l 
concep t of civil r e l o c a t i o n h a d 
u n d e r g r o u n d a n d above g r o u n d 
c o m p o n e n t s . The m a i n core of 
government decision-makers would 
be housed in three interconnected 
fallout-proof underground shelters 
located upwind of Ottawa.28 
The m a i n s i t e w a s p l a n n e d o n t h e 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i t would h o u s e the Prime 
Minister and cabinet (24 people); the Governor-
General; several jus t i ces from the Sup reme 
Court; the Commissioner of the RCMP; and the 
Federal Civil Defence Coordinator. The skeleton 
bureaucracy, approximately 80 people from each 
federal government depar tment for a total 900, 
would occupy requisitioned buildings in several 
O t t awa Valley t o w n s ( k n o w n a s F e d e r a l 
Department Relocation Sites (FDRS)). These 
sites theoretically would serve as rallying points 
first, and then function as bureaucrat ic entities 
later. Staff would be billeted in local homes.2 9 
The FDRS locations were based on their 
proximity to Ottawa and the fact tha t they were 
u p w i n d . S u r v e y s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e b e s t 
buildings were schools with basements . External 
Affairs was to deploy to the Ontario Agricultural 
College at Kemptville, while the Post Office would 
move to the Post Office building at Renfrew. A 
wart ime censorship group would occupy the 
Pembroke post office. The CBC got the Federal 
Building in Smith 's Falls. Other depar tments 
would head for Almonte, Carleton Place, and 
Arnprior.30 
The des ign a n d locat ion of the p e r m a n e n t 
emergency federal government u n d e r g r o u n d 
facility underwent several evaluations. Original 
p l a n s e n v i s i o n e d t h r e e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d 
47 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss1/5
underground buildings: a communications 
centre, an administrative centre, and an 
executive centre. Each would house 500 people. 
Some planners considered this to be too 
vu lnerab le : all three bui ld ings , though 
underground, were clustered together and there 
was only one communications centre. An 
alternative was to split the communications 
between two 750-man buildings and put more 
distance between them. This lowered the 
administrative efficiency of the complex and 
increased costs, since communications would 
have to be duplicated.31 
The main underground structure protection 
specifications included the need to withstand 
100 pounds per square inch overpressure, and 
48 
to provide protection against 
other nuc l ea r weapons 
effects like hea t and 
radiation. In other words, 
the facility had to be able to 
survive an explosion from a 
five megaton nuclear weapon 
exploded no less than 1.1 
miles away. These were the 
ba lanced and op t imum 
specifications. P lanners 
noted that: 
It is possible to construct 
underground installations 
capable of withstanding the 
blast of a nuclear explosion 
somewhat nearer, but the 
limited increase in the chance 
of survival afforded by this 
extra degree of protection 
would not appear to warrant 
the greatly increased costs 
involved.32 
F u r t h e r m o r e : 
...since the installations could 
be destroyed by deliberate 
a t t a c k on them, if the i r 
locations were known and a 
sufficient number of weapons 
were employed, it is proposed 
to improve the safety factor by 
assigning personnel to [two 
executive] structures...to give 
each a capability of carrying 
on c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t 
independently....If more than 
two executive s t r u c t u r e s 
should be provided later, the 
difficulty to an enemy of destroying them all by 
deliberate attack would be correspondingly 
increased.33 
Thus, the site's primary protection was 
concealment, followed by the physical protection 
provided by the structures themselves. 
The s i tes were use l e s s wi thou t 
communications and great pains were taken to 
ensure that there were enough redundant land-
line telephones, cryptography machines , 
teleprinters, transmitters, and receivers built 
into the plans. Dispersion, not hardening, was 
the key here. 
The main problem was cost. Ideally, there 
should have been several dispersed underground 
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sites in the Ottawa Valley area, each with its own 
main communications suite and a backup. The 
finalized p lan reflected compromise and 
consisted of one large underground building and 
three widely dispersed antenna farms, one of 
which contained an underground transmitter 
facility. Planners left open the possibility that 
more sites could be added later if funds were 
made available. 
The Government of Canada expropriated 
pre-selected private land, to the hue and cry of 
Members of Parliament representing the towns 
of Carp, Almonte, Dunrobin, and Perth.34 This 
presented COG planners with a conundrum. 
What exactly was the cover story for these 
facilities? The initial press release on 6 August 
1959 stated that: 
The Canadian Army has received approval to 
cons t ruc t an Exper imental Army Signals 
Establishment in the area of Carp, Almonte, and 
Arnprior . This will involve a n u m b e r of 
transmitting and receiving facilities and buildings 
to service them.35 
Experimental Army Signals Establishment 
or EASE became the cover name for this group 
of structures, probably because there was an 
experimental signals facility located near 
Shirley's Bay west of Ottawa and just north of 
the planned sites. The proper name for the Carp 
facility was the National Emergency 
Headquarters. It was later changed to the Central 
Emergency Government Headquarters. 
EASE consisted of antenna farms located at 
Dunrobin, Robertson (near Perth), and Almonte. 
Robertson, the transmitter site, had a two-level 
underground bunker manned by signals 
personnel . Dunrobin and Almonte were 
receivers. The main site at Carp was an 
underground building built on the site of William 
Montgomery's gravel pit by The Foundation 
Company of Canada. It was completed and 
manned early in 1962, in time for the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. 
EASE had four underground levels. The 
bottom floor was a huge vault, which belonged 
to the Bank of Canada. The third had messes 
and living quarters. The second floor had offices 
and the operations centre. The operations centre 
was equipped with a device called an 
"Iconorama," which was a large electric map-like 
display for updates and situation reports. The 
first floor contained an infirmary, heat and 
ventilation units, and more working spaces.36 
EASE was located within a five-minute drive 
from a Department of Transportation airport. 
The Carp airport was capable of handling all 
types of transport aircraft and helicopters. 
Construction on EASE continued into late 
1961. EASE, unfortunately, came under very 
public scrutiny while under construction. The 
press did not buy the cover story. The first report 
came out in the Ottawa Citizen in April 1961, 
though the author was unsure as to what extent 
the Carp facility was to be used to store 
important records and to what extent it was a 
relocation site for the leadership.37 This was 
mostly speculation based on a "leak." Later the 
Toronto Telegram deliberately and seriously 
compromised the security of the EASE site at 
Carp. Journalists flew over the site in a private 
plane and photographed it. The resulting 
photograph, along with a banner headline "This 
is the Diefenbunker!" accompanied by an arrow 
pointing to the unfinished site, appeared on 11 
September 1961. Reporters canvassed the Carp 
locals in an effort to glean more information and 
came away convinced that it was a three-level 
s t r u c t u r e , 80 feet u n d e r g r o u n d , with 
accommodation for 400 people and supplies for 
six weeks of operations.38 
The EMO director, R.B. Curry, suggested to 
Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness 
that further press releases should be used to 
deflect media speculation with a gradual release 
of some but not all information. One path was 
to rename EASE as the Canadian Army Signals 
Es t ab l i shmen t , billing i t as the main 
communications centre for the Army. The aim 
here was to emphasize its "peacetime" role and 
de-emphasize its "wartime" role. 
Curry also thought that revealing the 
existence of similar regional underground 
facilities (called BRIDGE sites, discussed below) 
and implying that Carp was just one of eleven 
sites across the country would confuse the 
enemy. This cross-country "shell game" would 
force the enemy to allocate scarce resources in 
an attempt to "take out" Canada's leadership. 
They could not be sure which site the Prime 
Minister and the military leadership were in. 
49 
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Two views of the EASE facility or the National 
Emergency Headquarters at Carp, west of Ottawa 
Were they, in fact, ensconced in EASE? In 
RUSTIC? In one often BRIDGE sites? Could the 
Soviets afford to allocate 12 of the potentially 
250 weapons deliverable against North America 
just to destroy Canada's leadership when they 
had more pressing targets like 50 primary and 
100 secondary SAC bases and the American 
command and control system, which itself was 
in hard, dispersed shelters?39 
Project BRIDGE, as originally conceived in 
1959, was not intended as a "shell game" 
deception scheme for the federal government. 
In alignment with the RUSTIC/EASE projects, 
COG planners wanted interim and permanent 
provincial facilities. Originally called "Little 
RUSTIC" and later changed to BRIDGE,40 this 
project was to s i t ua t e an opera t ional 
headquarters in each province to: 1) provide a 
base to direct the functions of federal and 
provincial emergency government; 2) house a 
command element for Army forces engaged in 
National Survival operations; and 3) protect the 
cross-country Canadian Army Signals System 
nodes, upon which Phase I and Phase II military 
operations were dependent.41 Other functions 
were later added. Effective COG, civil defence, 
and national survival planning depended on the 
speed of transfer of accurate information both 
to the population and to the central government. 
The public needed to be warned of an attack 
and the National Attack Warning System, based 
primarily on sirens, was established to do just 
that. These devices needed activation and the 
BRIDGE sites could provide this. Similarly, the 
government and military leaders needed to know 
just what damage had been done to the nation. 
A series of National Defence Fallout Reporting 
Posts were established in un-hardened shelters 
near each metropolitan area in Canada. If these 
areas were hit, this information was to be passed 
on to the BRIDGE site and forwarded to EASE 
50 
and RUSTIC. Duty staffs continuously kept track 
of meteorological conditions so that fallout 
patterns could be determined and reported as 
soon as possible.42 The standards for interim 
BRIDGE site construction were similar to 
RUSTIC, in that: 
...the buildings and communications be built to 
enable operations to be carried on despite heavy 
fallout conditions, but that no special effort be 
made to safeguard the uni ts against blast 
damage. It is considered that these units will 
hardly be important enough to be targets for 
attack...43 
In fact, one COG planner noted that: 
It is not considered either possible or necessary 
to keep secret the nature, purpose, or locations 
of these regional emergency headquarters. They 
are not considered large enough or vital enough 
individually to be likely to constitute a target for 
a nuclear weapon...The knowledge that these 
units are being built and manned would give the 
public some assurance that the Government is 
doing what is possible to prepare for even a 
missile war, despi te the impossibi l i ty of 
intercepting the missiles themselves. This visible 
action by the Government in cooperation with 
the Provinces would help convince the Canadian 
people that the situation warrants their taking 
action to safeguard themselves against fallout. 
Moreover, the knowledge of these regional 
projects may help to confuse the potential 
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attacker about the significance of the EASE signal 
centre at Carp.44 
Some quarters did not like this proposed 
open information policy. The concentration of 
several provincial, federal, and military 
functions, particularly the co-location of the 
communications nodes with them, dictated the 
need for a cover plan. The existing cover plan 
for the federal centre at Carp, that of an Army 
signals facility, was also used for the permanent 
BRIDGE sites that were under construction. 
They were referred to as "Canadian Army Signals 
Stations." Thus the COG planners had to deny 
that these sites had anything to do with 
provincial COG and its relationship to the federal 
government COG planning. Consequently, 
revealing that they were regional COG sites for 
propaganda purposes was counterproductive.45 
Eventually, EMO and the Army developed a 
jo int informat ion secur i ty policy. Any 
relationship between the BRIDGE sites and 
EASE was Top Secret. The specific locations of 
the p e r m a n e n t BRIDGE si tes and their 
relationship to each other was Secret. Any 
matters not related to weapons effects and 
structural design was Confidential, leaving any 
other information, including design, Restricted.46 
The Prime Minister, however, thwarted the 
information policy in 1961 when he announced 
in Parliament that the Government was to 
construct several regional wartime provincial 
headquarters. The actual contract tenders for 
"underground bunkers" was highlighted by the 
Opposition in Parliament in January 1961 to 
embarrass the Government after a dramatic 
story in the Financial Post told readers to "watch 
for big war citadel contracts soon."47 Officials 
played down the speculation, though the press 
started to take more interest, which culminated 
in the Toronto Telegram revelations discussed 
earlier.48 
Project BRIDGE consisted of ten planned 
underground complexes, one in each province, 
[see Fig 3.] The interim BRIDGE sites were 
located in the basements of existing buildings 
and even in a rubber factory in Holyrod, 
Newfoundland.49 The permanent BRIDGE sites 
were similar to EASE in terms of layout, with a 
smaller communications capability. Each site 
was a two-storey underground bunker with 
6,365 square metres of floor space and had two 
dispersed antenna farms (one to receive and the 
other to transmit) and an underground staff/ 
receiver building. Since the degree of protection 
and control was different for each province, there 
were several types of BRIDGE buildings. For 
example, Ontario (BRIDGE 5) and Quebec 
(BRIDGE 6) had 58,400 square feet facilities 
with a manning level of 275 people, while 
Saskatchewan (BRIDGE 3) was programmed for 
43,200 square feet and 191 people.50 
It should be noted at this point that some 
COG planners thought that the buildings were 
too smal l . One recommended tha t , "by 
eliminating the females from the staff a great deal 
of space could be saved." This clearly ruled out 
breeding prodigiously and preserving a nucleus 
of human specimens.51 
The lucky few selected to man each BRIDGE 
site in an emergency broke down as follows:52 
55 federal personnel (RCMP, Health and Welfare, 
Agriculture, etc); 68 provincial (including the 
Lieutenant-Governor and the Premier); 25 Army 
staff (including the General Officer Commanding 
the military area of the province); a ten-man 
warning component (meteorologists); and 28 
housekeeping staff (medical, cooks, plumbers, 
electricians). Finally, there were the all-important 
communicators, 83 of them, to handle the 
myriad of signalling equipment.53 Each site had 
to handle several types of communications. 
Warning of an attack had to come in from EASE 
or elsewhere and be passed on by BRIDGE to 
the national attack warning system. Information 
from the nuclear detonation reporting stations 
and radiation monitoring stations after an attack 
had to be passed to EASE. Some BRIDGES acted 
as relay stations for information moving from 
EASE to distant BRIDGES. Re-entry columns 
had to be commanded. All of this entailed high 
frequency radio, landlines (telephone and 
teletype), a tape relay system, and telemetry from 
remote RADIAC sensors. All sites had on- and 
off-line crypto equipment, including the KW 26 
machine. Project BRIDGE also possessed a new 
high-tech system: the Muirhead Facsimile 
Recorder. A highly secret instrument, MUFAX 
was one of the first operational fax machines. 
MUFAX was a large device and allowed BRIDGES 
to pass on entire maps marked with predicted 
fallout and weather patterns.54 
51 
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The construct ion of Project BRIDGE'S 
permanent facilities ran into several delays which 
severely limited its usefulness during the Berlin 
and Cuban Missile Crises. Reduced COG funding 
in 1960 reduced the number of approved 
permanent sites to six, all of which were to be 
constructed on existing military bases: Nanaimo, 
British Columbia; Penhold, Alberta; Shilo, 
Manitoba; Borden, Ontario; Valcartier, Quebec; 
and Debert, Nova Scotia. The other provinces 
had to make do with in ter im BRIDGE 
arrangements.55 Shilo was continually plagued 
with labour strikes for two years.56 In November 
1962, right after the Cuban Missile Crisis, none 
of the permanent BRIDGE sites were fully 
equipped or manned.57 
More importantly, the Government had not 
provided funding to expand the Royal Canadian 
Signal Corps so that the sites could be manned 
by trained signals personnel. The Army's signal 
capability was stretched to the maximum by 
1961. In addition to EASE and BRIDGE, the 
Signal Corps was expected to maintain signal 
squadrons in the Congo, another in Germany 
with the NATO forces there, in Egypt with United 
Nations Emergency Force I, and on other 
peacekeeping operations world-wide. Each 
Canada-based brigade group earmarked for 
NATO or UN deployment also needed signals 
capability. This precluded supplying between 60 
and 90 signals personnel each to EASE, RUSTIC, 
and the ten BRIDGE sites.58 
So much for the physical characteristics of the COG system. How was it supposed to 
work in wartime and how did the system behave 
during the Berlin and Cuban crises in 1961 and 
1962? The best indications of this are provided 
by COG and civil defence exercises conducted 
in the early 1960s and their estimates as to the 
nature of the threat. 
The best threat estimate available to COG 
planners was made available in 1960. In honest 
language, a Secret EMO planning guide admitted 
that "The scale and pattern of attack on North 
America in general or on Canada in particular 
cannot be predicted with any accuracy."59 This 
did not prevent planners from providing some 
logical assumptions. North America would be 
attacked after escalation from other events or at 
52 
the start of a general war as a surprise attack. 
Conventional attack was unlikely. No form of 
nuclear attack on North America would leave 
Canada untouched. Weapons yields would be 
between five and 20 megatons.60 
EMO figured that there would be little 
strategic warning. Tactical warning for a manned 
bomber attack was two to four hours, ICBM's 
30 minutes, and 15 minutes for submarine-
launched missiles. There may be additional 
warning "since the bases of U.S. retaliatory forces 
are likely to be primary targets, and population 
centres might be left to a follow up attack."61 
Laudably, EMO was not b l ind to 
technological change. For the 1960 to 1961 
period, the planners noted that the enemy would 
rely on manned bombers, supplemented by very 
small numbers of ICBMs and submarine-
launched missiles. The ratio for the 1962-1963 
time frame was reversed, with reliance placed 
on missiles, with bombers used to supplement. 
Between 1964 and 1970 the a t tack was 
postulated to consist of large numbers of missiles 
and air-launched cruise missiles.62 
The presc ien t p l anne r s made a very 
important prediction. Once the United States 
moved from bombers operating from airfields 
to hardened missile sites, the probability was 
high that the Soviets would shift their targeting 
away from the sites and against the command 
structure, which would alter the fallout patterns 
and produce less fallout onto Canada . 
Alternatively, the enemy might choose a 
psychological strategy intended to intimidate the 
population by targeting a small number of cities, 
probably those capable of supporting NATO 
operations in Europe (like Montreal, Quebec, 
and Halifax) in the hopes that Canada would 
withdraw from a war.63 
What did all of this mean for the Canadian 
COG system? If an enemy attack followed a 
counter-force pattern against American Strategic 
Air Command bases, the COG system as it 
existed between 1960 and 1963 would probably 
have been adequate, since damage to Canada 
would be less than other forms of attack. There 
was, of course, the probability that weapons from 
aircraft destroyed over Canada or delivered by 
error would cause random damage. This was 
very different from earlier thinking in which all 
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major Canadian cities would be attacked 
indiscriminately. 
Exercise TOCSIN 1960 (tocsin is an alarm 
sounded on a bell) held on 3 May 1960 was 
designed to test the existing COG and national 
survival systems at all levels, specifically the 
manning of COG facilities. The staffs had three 
hours warning time to deploy to the sites and 
establish minimal communication. The specific 
movements and identities of participants and the 
lessons learned have been obscured with time, 
but there are indications that the BRIDGE staffs 
were unable to work effectively as teams and that 
the communications system became rapidly 
overloaded with traffic.84 
TOCSIN 1961, held on 5-6 May 1961, 
operated on similar assumptions as TOCSIN 
1960. It was structured to practice manning the 
interim BRIDGE sites, the partially-completed 
BRIDGE 5 at Camp Borden, and RUSTIC. Other 
exercise objectives involved tes t ing the 
communications system and the National Attack 
Warning System sirens. An additional objective 
was "to make the general public conscious of 
survival operations."65 
TOCSIN 1961 also featured relocating the 
Ministers of National Defence, Health and 
Welfare, Defence Production, and the Solicitor 
General to RUSTIC. Air movement was not used. 
A special train was arranged and pre-positioned 
on the tracks across the Rideau Canal from the 
East Block of the Parliament Buildings.66 
The attack pattern appears to have been 
based on a counter-city scenario. The nine 
primary targets in such a scenario were 
Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa, Hamilton, 
Windsor (because of its proximity to Detroit), 
Halifax, Winnipeg and Edmonton.67 Weapon 
accuracy was assumed to be 100% and all 
weapons were ground bursts. Even with three 
hours' warning, the final report ruefully noted 
that: 
The scale of the attack simulated in the EMO 
exercise was so heavy that little action could have 
been taken...to influence the battle for some days. 
The only role left would have been to gather 
information, think ahead, and plan to resume 
centralized control when possible.68 
Conditions in BRIDGE 5 were superior to 
those encountered within the BRIDGE system 
on TOCSIN 1960. Premier Frost of Ontario and 
his staff were enthusiastic participants and the 
Army staff was a well-oiled machine. The 
problem again was with the civilian heads of 
departments who were functioning in ad hoc 
teams again to little effect and efficiency. An 
embarrassing glitch was revealed when someone 
noticed that the teletype relay between RUSTIC 
and BRIDGE 5 ran through Toronto, a primary 
target.69 There was, apparently, no security for 
the special train: any derelict from the Byward 
Market could conceivably have boarded for a 
one-way trip to Petawawa. 
The pressure brought to bear by the Berlin 
Crisis later in 1961 prompted Exercise TOCSIN 
B 1961 . Radically different from its 
predecessors, TOCSIN B planners made the 
exercise as realistic as possible, given the actual 
deteriorating international situation. The Soviets 
embarked on a nuclear weapons test series late 
in August, exploding 33 megaton-yield weapons 
at a rate of five a week. This culminated in a 
massive 58 megaton test, the largest ever 
recorded. The Diefenbaker government 
implemented some COG measures and explored 
the possibility of partially manning EASE, 
RUSTIC, and the interim BRIDGE sites.70 
At this point, the siren system was not 
complete, nor were EASE or the permanent 
BRIDGE sites. Yet by 24 August, the interim sites 
were all operating on a 24-hour basis. The 
installation of communications at EASE was 
accelerated, with a limited telephone capability 
available by November.71 
TOCSIN B was held on 13-14 November. It 
featured an attack pattern that was coordinated 
with the North American Air Defence Command's 
(NORAD) latest air defence exercise, DESKTOP 
IV. The sequence of events that TOCSIN B 
followed included a missile attack followed by a 
bomber attack. It postulated 12-minute warning 
for missile attack, with the first detonation on 
US targets within 25 minutes (submarine-
launched missiles), followed by five detonations 
against Canadian targets at the 35-minute mark 
(ICBMs). Enemy bombers hit NORAD radar 
cover at the same time as the initial missile 
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attacks and arrived over their targets within three 
hours.72 
Unlike TOCSIN 1961, Canadian targets 
included USAF Strategic Air Command facilities 
in Canada at Edmonton, Cold Lake, Churchill, 
Goose Bay, Stephenville, and Frobisher Bay; air 
defence bases at North Bay, Comox, and 
Chatham; and the cities of Ottawa, Toronto, 
Montreal, Vancouver, and Halifax as secondary 
targets. Niagara Falls and Windsor would get 
doses of radiation from their adjacent American 
targets, as would the western provinces since 
the scenario assumed that all SAC and air 
defence command bases on the Canada-US 
border would take hits. Canadian targets were 
assumed to take five-megaton hits and US targets 
ten, again assuming 100% accuracy with ground 
bursts. Only the SAC targets were targeted with 
more than one weapon.73 
TOCSIN B incorporated coordination with 
NORAD HQ and regions and even used the 
NORAD alerting procedures and code-names for 
states of readiness.74 Canada added the code-
name BIG SHOT to inform the COG system of 
fallout from missile strikes against SAC bases. 
Canada's leadership left Ottawa on COCKED 
PISTOL (DEFCON 2) before BIG NOISE/APPLE 
JACK (DEFCON 1) was signalled. The Cabinet 
and the Prime Minister went to RUSTIC, as did 
DND. Health and Welfare, Justice, Defence 
Production, and the RCMP moved to the Civil 
Defence College and the town of Arnprior. 
Transport moved to RCAF Station Uplands, 
while Fisheries shifted to the federal complex at 
Hogsback.75 
As usual, not all went well. Sixty of the 500 
recently-installed NSAWS sirens did not function 
and the staff for BRIDGE 2 (Penhold, Alberta) 
did not clear Edmonton before the city was 
"destroyed" by a five megaton missile 35 minutes 
into the exercise.76 
COG procedures were under continual 
review throughout 1962. For example, once 
EASE was opera t ional at Carp, the air 
movements plan to support COG changed. The 
North Star was gone. On order a Vertol 107 
Labrador helicopter would leave RCAF Trenton 
for Rockliffe, where it would be held at 30 
minutes readiness. On direction from Air Force 
HQ, it would then move to the grass area in front 
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of the Peace Tower and pick up no more than 
ten senior government officials. It would then 
"depart Parliament Hill for a relocation centre 
as directed by the senior government official 
present."77 The other officials would leave by 
private motor vehicle for their respective sites. 
Federal Department Relocation Site planning 
was refined further, with more building surveys 
conducted in the Ottawa Valley to house the 
skeleton bureaucracy, though the biggest 
problem lay in determining what records should 
be stored outside of Ottawa and where they 
should be located. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis should have been 
an opportune time to exercise COG planning, 
given the dire nature of the international 
situation. The system had undergone some 
manning practice during NATO exercise FALLEX 
62, held in September 1962. FALLEX 62 dealt 
mostly with military responses to a projected 
international crisis and was based on a quite 
soph is t i ca ted crisis scenar io . Civilian 
participation from the federal government was 
lacking, however.78 
John Diefenbaker's unwillingness to alert the 
nation and its armed forces in a timely fashion 
during the height of the crisis in October 196279 
voided the millions of dollars spent on COG 
facilities and planning. At a time of great danger 
this decision made by one man could have 
prevented the preserva t ion of Canada ' s 
government and, in some respects, Canadian 
society itself. Any supposedly efficient system is 
inevitably limited by "human meddling," as Dr. 
Strangelove would have put it. 
There would be other TOCSINs80 but the 
COG system would slowly decay in the face of 
the enemy's increased ability to deliver nuclear 
warheads by ICBM in the 1970s and 1980s. For 
a brief time, however, Canada's COG system was 
appropriate for the task assigned to it. It was a 
prudent measure, given the dangers inherent in 
the Cold War with its short and long term crises 
and ever increasing nuclear delivery capabilities. 
Notably, even the United States and the United 
Kingdom did not posses a hardened regional 
emergency headquarters system. Could the 
system have survived an initial onslaught and 
continued to function after 30 days during the 
1958 to 1963 period? Thankfully, we did not 
find out. 
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